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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we uncover a new off-path TCP hijacking attack that
can be used to terminate victim TCP connections or inject forged
data into victim TCP connections by manipulating the new mixed
IPID assignment method, which is widely used in Linux kernel
version 4.18 and beyond to help defend against TCP hijacking at-
tacks. The attack has three steps. First, an off-path attacker can
downgrade the IPID assignment for TCP packets from the more
secure per-socket-based policy to the less secure hash-based policy,
building a shared IPID counter that forms a side channel on the
victim. Second, the attacker detects the presence of TCP connec-
tions by observing the shared IPID counter on the victim. Third,
the attacker infers the sequence number and the acknowledgment
number of the detected connection by observing the side channel of
the shared IPID counter. Consequently, the attacker can completely
hijack the connection, i.e., resetting the connection or poisoning
the data stream.
We evaluate the impacts of this off-path TCP attack in the real
world. Our case studies of SSH DoS, manipulating web traffic, and
poisoning BGP routing tables show its threat on a wide range of
applications. Our experimental results show that our off-path TCP
attack can be constructed within 215 seconds and the success rate
is over 88%. Finally, we analyze the root cause of the exploit and
develop a new IPID assignment method to defeat this attack. We
prototype our defense in Linux 4.18 and confirm its effectiveness
through extensive evaluation over real applications on the Internet.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since the transmission control protocol (TCP) was first presented
in RFC 793 in 1981 [41], more than 100 TCP related RFCs have
been released to improve the protocol [13]. Consequently, it be-
comes difficult for off-path attackers to hijack TCP connections,
mainly due to the challenge of inferring the 32-bit random se-
quence numbers and acknowledgment numbers of a targeted TCP
connection [25, 32, 41, 49]. When launching a brute-force attack,
the attacker has to flood more than 300 million spoofed packets
at a time to the target systems that support both RFC 793 [41]
and RFC 5961 [44]. Hence, off-path TCP attacks mainly rely on
discovering side channel vulnerabilities to facilitate the inference
of the sequence and acknowledgment numbers [9–12, 23]. Fortu-
nately, most of the uncovered vulnerabilities have been fixed or
constrained by the security community [9, 10, 23].
In this paper, we uncover a new off-path TCP hijacking attack
that exploits the mixed IPID assignment method in the latest Linux
kernels (i.e., version 4.18 and beyond) to either terminate victim
TCP connections or inject malicious data into victim TCP connec-
tions. First, our attack tricks the victim Linuxmachine into adopting
the hash-based IPID assignment policy, instead of the by default
more secure per-socket-based IPID assignment policy, on socket
protocols such as TCP and UDP. Once the IPID assignment policy
for socket protocols (TCP in our attack) is downgraded, it builds
a side channel based on the IPID hash collisions of the globally
shared 2048 hash counters, i.e., identifying a shared IPID counter
on the victim by leveraging hash collisions. Second, by observing
the shared IPID counter, an off-path attacker can detect the pres-
ence of TCP connections on the victim. Third, the attacker infers
sequence and acknowledgment numbers of the victim connection
to completely hijack the connection. This new attack does not need
any assistance of puppets, i.e., unprivileged applications or sand-
boxed scripts controlled by attackers on victim hosts [23, 42, 43].
The Identification field of IP protocol (IPID) is used to indi-
cate the uniqueness of a packet [40, 50]. After abandoning two pre-
vious vulnerable IPID assignment methods (i.e., global IPID assign-
ment and per-destination IPID assignment) [14, 16, 17, 23, 29], Linux
currently assigns IPID to packets based on a mixed method [3, 7, 53].
If a packet is generated from socket protocols such as TCP and UDP,
Linux uses the per-socket-based IPID assignment policy that assigns
IPID to the packet based on the counter recorded in the protocol
socket. Otherwise, Linux adopts the hash-based IPID assignment
policy that assigns IPID based on one of the 2048 globally shared
hash counters. Since the counter recorded in the protocol socket
cannot be observed by off-path attackers, the per-socket-based IPID
assignment is more secure against off-path attacks. Linux uses the
DF (Don’t Fragment) flag in the packet header [40] to choose be-
tween the two policies, since only socket protocols can set this
flag to TRUE to perform the path MTU discovery (PMTUD) mech-
anism [34, 35]. In other words, if the DF flag is set to TRUE, it uses
the per-socket-based policy; otherwise, it chooses the hash-based
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policy. However, our study shows that the mixed IPID assignment
in Linux implementations has vulnerabilities that can be exploited
to launch a new off-path TCP hijacking attack.
Since Linux uses the more secure per-socket-based IPID assign-
ment by default for TCP connections, an off-path attacker first
tricks the victim into assigning IPID for its TCP packets using the
less secure hash-based IPID assignment. This goal can be achieved
by pretending to be a router and sending a forged ICMP “Frag-
mentation Needed” error message [39] to a victim. Since the ICMP
error message informs the victim that the packets issued from the
victim need to be fragmented and the DF flag is set, the victim will
be tricked into cleaning the DF flag of TCP packets and thus uses
the hash-based IPID assignment. Next, the victim chooses one IPID
counter from the 2048 hash counters to assign IPID for its TCP
packets. Among the 2048 globally shared hash counters, the target
counter is decided by the hash value of four components, i.e., three
fields of the packet (source IP address, destination IP address, protocol
number) and a random value generated on system boot. Due to the
small-sized hash counter pool, the attacker may identify the target
hash counter used in a victim TCP connection via hash collisions,
namely, alternating IP addresses to collide with the target counter.
Once the shared IPID counter is known, attackers can use the
challenge ACK mechanism [44] as trigger conditions to change the
shared IPID counter, facilitating the next two attack steps, i.e., to
detect the presence of the victim TCP connection and infer the
sequence and acknowledgment numbers. The attacker sends forged
TCP packets to the victim, and the triggered challenge ACK pack-
ets will alter the shared IPID counter under different situations.
It helps the attacker to determine if the specified values in the
forged TCP packets are correct. Note that our attack only leverages
the challenge ACK mechanism as trigger conditions to assist the
inference of a victim TCP connection, instead of directly exploit-
ing vulnerabilities in the challenge ACK mechanism to hijack TCP
connections [9, 10].
Our attack does not suffer from traditional noise challenges that
other works have to address [16, 17, 37, 38]. Since, in our attack,
irrelevant TCP traffic using per-socket-based counters, instead of
the hash-based counters, will not interfere with the attack traffic.
Moreover, we measure that non-TCP traffic also rarely interferes
with the attack. We evaluate the impacts of the new off-path TCP
vulnerability on the Internet. We find that more than 20% of the
Alexa (www.alexa.com) top 100k websites are vulnerable to our off-
path attack. Those websites can be tricked into cleaning the DF flag
and downgrading the IPID assignment from the per-socket-based
policy to the hash-based policy for their TCP packets after receiving
forged ICMP “Fragmentation Needed” messages. We implement
a PoC and perform case studies on a wide range of applications,
e.g., HTTP, SSH and BGP, to validate the effectiveness of the at-
tack. For example, an off-path attacker can detect and tear down
a SSH connection in 155 seconds on average and manipulate web
applications or BGP routing tables within 215 seconds. The average
success rate of our exploit is over 88%. These results demonstrate
that the off-path TCP exploit could cause serious damages in real
world.
Finally, we propose countermeasures that aim to eliminate the
root cause of the newly discovered off-path TCP attack. We fix
the mixed IPID assignment in Linux kernels by determining if a
packet is originated from TCP protocol on the Protocol field in
IP header, instead of the DF flag. We implement a prototype of our
countermeasure in Linux 4.18 and confirm its effectiveness through
experimental evaluation on the Internet.
Contributions. Our main contributions are the following:
• We uncover that the new mixed IPID assignment method can
still be exploited to hijack TCP connections by off-path attackers.
• We uncover a new side channel in IPID assignment in the latest
Linux kernels. We demonstrate that the side channel can be ex-
ploited to learn the presence of victim TCP connections and infer
the sequence and acknowledgment numbers of the connections.
• We measure the Alexa top 100k websites and find that more
than 20% of them are vulnerable to our off-path attack. We also
perform case studies on a wide range of applications on the
Internet and confirm the effectiveness of the attack.
• We analyze the root cause of the new attack and develop counter-
measures that use new IPID assignment methods for TCP packets.
Our prototype in Linux 4.18 validates its effectiveness.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we first introduce the IPID assignment policies
adopted in the latest Linux kernels. Next, we describe two key
mechanisms in TCP/IP operations, i.e., path MTU discovery and
challenge ACK, which are related to develop our exploit.
2.1 IPID Assignment in Linux
There are two basic IPID assignment policies in current Linux, i.e.,
IPID based on 2048 hash counters or IPID based on per-socket
counters, where the latter is specific to socket related protocols
such as TCP. Figure 1 illustrates the procedure of IPID assignment
in Linux version 4.18 and beyond. When a packet is generated, the
IP protocol first checks whether the packet is a TCP RST packet. If
yes, then the IPID of the packet is set to 0 directly. This assignment
is due to Geoffrey et al.’s disclosure of a side channel in previous
assignment methods, i.e., IPID of the RST packet was assigned based
on one of the 2048 hash counters before version 4.18, which can be
exploited to detect the presence of TCP connections [3].
RST IPID=0
DF=1
IPID=counter[hash];
counter[hash]+=
uniform[1, sys_ticks];
IPID=counter[socket];
counter[socket]+=1;
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
Packet
IPID=Null
IPID!=Null
IPID=0SYN/ACK
Packet
Figure 1: IPID assignment in Linux version 4.18 and beyond.
If the packet is not a TCP RST packet, IP protocol checks the
DF flag of the packet. IF the DF flag is set to FALSE, the IPID will
be assigned based on a hash counter. There are totally 2048 hash
counters in Linux. IP will select one from these counters according
to the hash value of 4 variables, i.e., source IP address and destination
IP address of the packet, the protocol number of the packet, and a
random value generated on system boot. After the IPID value is
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copied from the selected counter, the counter will increase by a
uniform distribution value between 1 and the number of system
ticks since the last packet transmission that used the same counter.
The system tick is usually measured in milliseconds.
When the DF flag is set to TRUE, except for the TCP SYN/ACK (both
the SYN flag and the ACK flag in TCP header are set to TRUE) packet
whose IPID is assigned to 0, IP assigns IPID for other packets based
on the second policy that is based on a per-socket counter unique
to each connection. The per-socket counter is usually initialized
to a random value. Then each time after a packet is transmitted
using this counter, the counter increases by 1. The per-socket-based
assignment policy is considered to be more secure and can avoid
being observed from off-path attackers. Since the DF flag of TCP
packets is be default set to TRUE to enable the path MTU discovery
mechanism, TCP packets follow this per-socket assignment policy.
Through studying the IPID assignment in Linux, we find that if
the DF flag of TCP packets can be cleared (i.e., set to FALSE), then
the IPID assignment to TCP packets will be downgraded from using
the per-socket-based policy to the hash-based policy.
2.2 Path MTU Discovery
To avoid IP fragmentation, RFC 1191 [35] and RFC 1981 [34] pro-
pose a mechanism to discover path MTU (PMTU) between two end
hosts, i.e., the minimum of all hops’ MTUs in the entire packet trans-
mission path. PMTUD relies on the DF flag. Before sending a packet,
the originator sets the DF flag of the packet to TRUE, indicating that
the packet is not allowed to be fragmented by intermediate routers.
If the packet exceeds a router’s next-hop MTU, the intermediate
router discards it and issues an ICMP Destination Unreachable mes-
sage (type 3) to the originator with the code Fragmentation Needed
and DF set (code 4) in IPv4 or an ICMPv6 Packet Too Big message
in IPv6, along with the router’s next-hop MTU value carried in
the ICMP message. After receiving the ICMP message, if the em-
bedded packet in the message passes the originator’s check, then
the originator reduces the size of subsequent packets according to
the carried next-hop MTU value in the message. The originator
repeats the sending process until a packet with certain size could
be forwarded to the destination, and it then sets the size as PMTU.
However, during this procedure, if an intermediate router’s next-
hop MTU is smaller than the originator’s acceptable minimum
PMTU min_pmtu that is a system variable in PMTUD implementa-
tions, the originator will resize the packet size to min_pmtu, clear
the DF flag of subsequent packets, and then send them out. In RFC
1191 [35], min_pmtu is recommended as 576 octets. However, it
varies in different implementations, e.g., 256 octets in FreeBSD, 296
octets in Mac OS, 552 octets in Linux, and 596 octets in Windows.
In most PMTUD implementations, hosts do not validate the
source and transmission path of ICMP “Fragmentation Needed”
messages (e.g., Linux kernel version 3.9 and beyond). Therefore, an
off-path attacker can pretend to be a router and forge such an ICMP
message specified with an extremely small next-hop MTU value.
Actually the specified next-hop MTU value can be even set to 68
octets, the minimum of PMTU value on the Internet. After sending
such a forged ICMP message to the originator, if the embedded
packet in the forged ICMP message can pass the originator’s check,
the originator will be tricked into clearing the DF flag, thus down-
grading the IPID assignment for TCP packets. According to RFC
792 [39], the forged ICMP message should embed at least 28 octets
data to pass the originator’s check. We will show that an ICMP
echo reply packet can be embedded in the forged ICMP message to
deceive the originator’s check.
2.3 Challenge ACKMechanism
To defeat blind in-window attacks on TCP, the challenge ACKmech-
anism was proposed as RFC 5961 [44]. In a nutshell, the challenge
ACK mechanism requires that the sender of packets triggering the
challenge conditions replies with the exact sequence number, not
just one within the receive window. Thus, it can prevent an off-path
attacker’s blind injection unless the attacker is extremely lucky to
be able to guess the exact sequence number with a probability of
1/232. The challenge ACK mechanism is designed to enhance the
security of TCP; however, we show that it can be abused to infer
the state of a victim TCP connection.
Our attack exploits the challenge conditions in three aspects.
First, if a receiver sees an incoming SYN segment, regardless of
the sequence number in the segment, it sends back an challenge
ACK to the sender to confirm the loss of the previous connection.
Only the legitimate remote peer will send a RST segment with
the correct sequence number (derived from the ACK field of the
challenge ACK packet) to prove that the previous connection is
indeed terminated. Off-path attackers cannot answer this challenge
with correct sequence number. We will show that this challenge
condition can be abused to detect victim TCP connections.
Second, when a receiver sees an incoming RST segment, if the
sequence number of the segment is outside the receive window,
the receiver simply discards the segment. Instead, if the sequence
number is in-window but does not exactly match the expected
next sequence number (i.e., RCV .NXT ), the receiver will send a
challenge ACK to the sender to confirm the reset action. We will
show that this challenge condition can be abused to judge the
correctness of the guessed sequence number.
Third, if a receiver sees an incoming ACK segment, it validates
the acknowledgment number of the segment (SEG .ACK ) with awin-
dow of SND.UNA−SND.MAX .WND <= SEG .ACK <= SND.NXT ,
where SND.UNA is the sequence number of the first unacknowl-
edged octet, SND.MAX .WND is the maximum window size that
the receiver has ever seen from its peer. The receiver considers that
the acknowledgment number is legal and accepts it if the acknowl-
edgment number is in this range. If SEG .ACK is in the range of
[SND.UNA − (231 − 1), SND.UNA − SND.MAX .WND], i.e., the
challenge ACK window, the receiver responds with a challenge ACK
packet. We will show this challenge condition can be abused to
judge the correctness of guessed acknowledgment number.
3 ATTACK OVERVIEW
3.1 Threat Model
Figure 2 illustrates the threat model of our off-path TCP exploit.
It involves three hosts, i.e., a victim client, a victim server, and an
off-path attacker. The server and the client communicate based
on a TCP connection, while the off-path attacker aims to hijack
the connection. The off-path attacker cannot eavesdrop the traffic
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transferred between the server and the client as the man-in-the-
middle attacker does. However, the attacker is capable of sending
spoofed packets with the IP addresses of the server and the client.
This capability assumption is practical, since at least a quarter of the
Autonomous Systems (ASes) on the Internet do not filter packets
with spoofed source addresses leaving their networks [33].
Internet
Victim server Victim client
Attacker
Off-path
Figure 2: Threat model
3.2 Attack Procedure
Our off-path TCP exploit consists of three main steps to hijack a
victim TCP connection.
Step 1: Detecting Victim Clients. The attacker first downgrades
the server’s IPID assignment from the per-socket-based policy to
the hash-based policy. Then, through hash collisions, the attacker
detects victim clients who share the same IPID counter with the
attacker on the server side, i.e., the server uses the same hash-based
IPID counter to assign IPID for TCP packets to the victim client
and for packets to the attack machine.
Step 2: Detecting TCP Connections. Once a potential victim
client is detected, the attacker impersonates the victim client and
sends spoofed SYN/ACK packets to the server. Then, by observing
the change of the shared IPID counter, the attacker can determine
the correctness of the specified source port number in the spoofed
SYN/ACK packets and thus detect the presence of the TCP connec-
tion between the server and the victim client.
Step 3: Inferring Sequence and Acknowledgment Numbers.
After a victim TCP connection is identified, the attacker sends
spoofed RST packets and ACK packets to the connection, and triggers
challenge ACK mechanism on the connection. By observing the
changes of the shared IPID counter, the attacker can determine the
correctness of the specified sequence number and acknowledgment
number in the forged packets.
After correctly identifying the sequence numbers and acknowl-
edgment numbers of the victim connection, the attacker can forge
malicious TCP segments with the identified values and inject the
segments into the victim connection to either reset the connection
or poison the data stream. In the next three sections, we will detail
the above three steps.
4 DETECTING VICTIM CLIENTS
In this section, we present the method of building the IPID side
channel to detect potential victim clients. First, we present the
method of downgrading the IPID assignment from the per-socket-
based policy to the hash-based policy. Second, we describe how to
detect potential victim clients who share the same IPID counter
with the attacker on the server side.
4.1 Downgrading the IPID Assignment
Linux assigns IPID for packets based on the DF flag. If the DF flag
is set to TRUE, Linux will assign IPID for the packet based on a
per-socket IPID counter; otherwise, based on a hash IPID counter.
However, we observe that the DF flag can be maliciously cleared
by off-path attackers, thus downgrading the IPID assignment. The
attacker pretends to be a router and sends a forged ICMP “Frag-
mentation Needed” message to the victim server, indicating that
a router between the server and the client has a smaller next-hop
MTU and the packet is not allowed to be fragmented.
In order to trick the server into accepting the forged ICMP “Frag-
mentation Needed” message and clearing the DF flag of TCP packets
sent to the client, the forged ICMP message needs to satisfy two
conditions. First, the server does not validate the source of the ICMP
message, i.e., the forged ICMP message from off-path attackers will
not be discarded by the server. In practice, the validation requires
extra functionality support from hardware devices [52], since ma-
jor OSes, e.g., Linux 3.9 and beyond, do not perform the validation
but directly accept the message. Second, the data embedded in the
forged ICMP message must be able to evade the server’s checks.
RFC 792 [39] states that ICMP error messages should be embedded
at least 28 octets (i.e., the IP header plus at least the first 8 octets) of
the triggering packet, which is used by the server to match the mes-
sage to the appropriate process. Moreover, according to the newer
standard RFC 1812 [4], ICMP error messages should be embedded
as much of the triggering packet as possible, but not exceeding 576
octets. Hence, the attacker has to craft and embed feasible data into
the forged ICMP error message to evade the server’s check.
Protocol = ICMP
Source address        = Attacker
Destination address = Server
Type = 3 Code = 4
Next-hop MTU = 68
Protocol = ICMP
Source address        = Server
Destination address = Client
Type = 0 Code = 0
‘0’ * 520
V4 IHL = 20 TOS Total Length = 576
IPID X|DF|MF Frag Offset
TTL IP Header Checksum
ICMP Checksum
Unused = 0
V4 IHL = 20 TOS Total Length
IPID X|DF|MF Frag Offset
TTL IP Header Checksum
ICMP Checksum
Identifier Sequence number
IP
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Figure 3: Structure of the forged ICMP error message.
To evade the server’s check, we can embed the ICMP echo reply
data into the forged ICMP “Fragmentation Needed” message, as
shown in Figure 3. When servers equipped with Linux 3.9 and
beyond receive such an ICMP “Fragmentation Needed” message
embedded with an echo reply, the server does not check whether
it sent the embedded echo reply data earlier. Instead, it directly
responds to the forged ICMP error message and clears the DF flag of
subsequent packets sent to the client whose IP address is specified in
the embedded echo reply. Even if the server checks on the embedded
echo reply data, it is easy for attackers to circumvent this checking.
For example, the attacker can impersonate the client and initiate
an ICMP echo request to the server, triggering the server to send
an echo reply message. Then, the attacker pretends to be a router
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Attacker Victim server Victim client
 requestsrc.ip=attacker
reply IPID=x
SYNsrc.ip=client
SYN/ACKIPID=4444
 requestsrc.ip=attacker
reply IPID=x+1
ICMP
ĀFragmentation Neededā
{Clearing the DF flag of 
packets to the client
(a) No hash collisions with the client
Attacker Victim server Victim client
 requestsrc.ip=attacker
reply IPID=x
SYNsrc.ip=client
SYN/ACKIPID=x+1
 requestsrc.ip=attacker
reply IPID=x+2
ICMP
ĀFragmentation Neededā
{Clearing the DF flag of 
packets to the client
(b) Hash collisions with the client
Figure 4: Detecting potential victim clients through hash collisions.
and sends an ICMP “Fragmentation Needed” message embedded
with the known echo reply data to the server, tricking the server
into accepting the forged message. Note the next-hop MTU value
specified in the forged ICMP “Fragmentation Needed” message
should be smaller than the server’s acceptable minimum PMTU
min_pmtu, as described in Section 2.2. Actually, the value can be
set to 68 octets, which is always smaller than the system variable
of min_pmtu in various IP implementations. Besides, we find that
a forged ICMP error message embedded with a GRE data [18] can
also be used to trick the server into clearing the DF flag.
In a nutshell, it is difficult to verify the legitimacy of ICMP error
messages on the Internet. Therefore, an attacker can forge an ICMP
message and trick the server into accepting it. The forged ICMP
error messages can force the server to clear the DF flag of packets
sent to the victim client. Thus, the IPID assignment can be easily
downgraded by attackers.
4.2 Constructing Hash Collisions
The server will assign IPID to the packets by using one of 2048 hash
counters once the TCP packet’s DF flag is cleared. The counter is
selected based on four factors, i.e., source IP address, destination IP
address, protocol number (e.g., 1 represents ICMP protocol, 6 repre-
sents TCP protocol) of the packet, and a random value generated on
system boot. A hash index computed from the four factors is used
to select one counter from the 2048 hash IPID counters. Hence, if
the TCP packets sent to the victim client have the same hash value
as the packets sent to the attacker, the server will use the same IPID
counter to assign IPID for those packets to different destinations.
Therefore, by constructing hash collisions using Equation 1, the
attacker can detect the victim clients who share the same IPID
counter on the server side. In other words, the shared IPID counter
forms a side channel, which can be exploited to infer TCP connec-
tions between the server and the detected client. Our attack uses
the ICMP protocol to detect hash collisions due to its simplicity
and observability.
hash(server_IP , client_IP,TCP ,Boot_key) =
hash(server_IP ,attacker_IP, ICMP ,Boot_key) (1)
The procedure of detecting victim clients by constructing hash
collisions is shown in Figure 4. First, the attacker pretends to be a
router and sends a forged ICMP “Fragmentation Needed” message
to the server, who will be tricked into clearing the DF flag and
downgrading the IPID assignment of packets to the client whose
IP address is specified in the forged ICMP message. Second, the
attacker initiates ICMP echo requests to the server and observes
the IPID of the reply packets. Then the attacker impersonates the
client and sends a spoofed SYN packet to the server’s listening port
(e.g., 80). Following the three-way handshake process of TCP, the
server will respond an SYN/ACK packet to the client. Here, the key
difference is that if the attacker’s IP address collides with the client
(i.e., the attacker and the client share the same hash-based IPID
counter at the server side), the IPID assignment for the SYN/ACK
packet will incur an additional increment to the shared IPID counter,
which can be observed by the attacker 1. Otherwise, if there is no
collision, the IPID observed by the attacker will be continuous
distribution, i.e., without additional increment. Using this method,
the attacker can identify victim clients who collide with its IP
address and share the same IPID counter.
The hash-based IPID counter does not increase linearly. Instead,
the increment is a random value in a uniform distribution between
1 and the number of system ticks since the last packet transmission
that used the same counter. Hence, if the attacker wants to force the
counter to increase linearly and facilitate the observation, it needs
to restrict the increment of system ticks related to the IPID counter.
Usually, if more than 3 packets are sent to the server under 10ms ,
the random value added to the IPID counter will never be larger
than one [3]. We send ICMP request packets to the server in parallel
and restrict the increment of system ticks. Our experiments show
that if the round-trip time (RTT) from the attacker to the server is
within 200ms , the attacker only needs to send less than 300 packets
per second to force the hash-based IPID counter increasing linearly.
There are totally 2048 hash-based IPID counters in Linux, and the
probability of hash collisions between the attacker and the client is a
geometric distribution. When the protocol is specified as ICMP (see
Eq. 1), if the attacker has k IP addresses, the probability of collisions
between the attacker and the target client is 1 − (1 − p)k , where p
equals 1/2048. To construct an attack in practice, the attacker has
two strategies to detect victim clients by leveraging hash collisions.
1A special case is that the source port in a spoofed SYN packet happens to match the
source port of a TCP connection from the client to the server. In this case, the spoofed
SYN packet will trigger a challenge ACK packet, instead of a SYN/ACK packet. However,
the attacker can still observe an additional increment to the shared IPID counter.
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Attacking Potential Targets. If the attacker has only one or a
few IP addresses, the attacker can detect potential victim clients
who collide with the attacker. In theory, if the attacker has only one
IP address, on a target server, the number of clients conflicting with
the attacker is 232/2048 = 221. Since the detection only depends
on the server side, the attacker can create a list of IP addresses
and select one from the list as the client’s IP address each time.
Following the procedure in Figure 4, the attacker can determine if
the selected one is a victim. In this way, the attacker can identify
and enumerate all the potential victim clients who are vulnerable to
its IP address. In our test, an attacker can detect more than 20 victim
clients within 6 minutes using one IP address (see Section 7.1).
Attacking Arbitrary Targets. If the attacker has enough number
of IP addresses, it can attack arbitrary TCP connections by alter-
nating its IP addresses to generate the hash collision. According
to the geometric probability distribution, if the attacker has more
than 2048 IP addresses, it can collide with any clients with above
63.2% probability. Especially, for servers having the IPv4 and IPv6
dual-stack, attackers can use IPv6 addresses to construct hash colli-
sions with arbitrary target clients, since both IPv4 and IPv6 use the
same 2048 hash-based IPID counters [53].
The detected hash-based IPID counter shared with the victim
client is stable. That is, if the server does not restart (i.e., the
Boot_key in Eq. 1 is not altered), the client’s TCP connection will
always share this IPID counter with the attacker. In practice, servers
(e.g., web servers and BGP routers) do not restart frequently. Hence,
the attacker can detect shared IPID counters and victim clients in
advance, regardless of if TCP connections have been established.
Note Linux assigned IPID to RST packets based on hash coun-
ters before version 4.18, and thus an attacker can observe its IPID
distribution to determine if it shares the same counter with the
client by spoofing SYN/ACK packets [3]. This vulnerability has been
fixed since Linux 4.18 by always setting the IPID of RST packets to
0, incurring no changes on any IPID counters. However, we find
that after the critical step of downgrading the IPID assignment,
an attacker can still detect hash collisions through forging SYN
packets and triggering the server to respond SYN/ACK packets and
then identify a victim client. Moreover, we will show that the fix
of assigning 0 to RST packets introduces yet another vulnerability,
which can be exploited by a pure off-path attacker to detect the
presence of victim TCP connections (see Section 5.1).
5 DETECTING TCP CONNECTIONS
Once a victim client is identified, the attacker can learn the presence
of TCP connections between the client and the server.
5.1 TCP Connection Detection
A TCP connection is identified by a four-tuple, i.e., [source IP ad-
dress, source port number, destination IP address, destination port
number]. Usually, the destination IP address, and port number are
public known, so an attacker only needs to infer the source IP ad-
dress and source port number. In our attack, since the victim client
can be detected by using hash collisions, the only missing tuple is
the source port number.
Assuming that a TCP connection from source port y has been
established earlier by a legal user in the victim client, an off-path
attacker can identify this port number by sending out probing
packets. First, the attacker continuously sends ICMP echo request
packets to the server and observes the IPID values of the reply
packets from the server. Then, the attacker impersonates the victim
client and sends a forged SYN/ACK packet with a guessed source
port number to the server. If the source port number specified
in the SYN/ACK packet does not equal y, according to the TCP
specification [41], the server will respond a RST packet to the client.
Due to the patch fixing the vulnerability identified by Alexander et
al. [3], Linux kernel versions 4.18 and beyond assign an IPID of 0
to the RST packet, which will not incur an increment to the shared
IPID counter. Hence, the IPID values in the reply packets observed
by the attacker are continuous.
If the guessed source port number specified in the forged SYN/ACK
packet equals y, the challenge ACKmechanism [44] makes the server
send a challenge ACK packet to the victim client for confirming the
legitimacy of the SYN/ACK packet. The IPID in the challenge ACK
packet will be assigned based on the shared IPID counter, which
will incur an additional increment to the counter. Thus, from the
view of the attacker, the IPID values in the reply packets from the
server will not be continuous.
The attacker repeats the above procedure, i.e., changing the
source port number specified in the forged SYN/ACK packet and
then observing the IPID of the reply packets, until the correct port
number y is identified. Finally, the TCP connection running on the
identified four-tuple is all known to the attacker.
5.2 Practical Considerations in Detection
There are three practical considerations that may have impact on
the detection time cost and the success rate.
(1) Unexpected Responses to SYN/ACK Packets. According to
the TCP specification, when receiving an unexpected SYN/ACK
packet, the server responds a RST packet to the client. However,
in practice, the RST packet may not be sent to the client in two
circumstances. First, some TCP implementations may not follow
the specification strictly, i.e., the server does not issue a RST packet
when an unexpected SYN/ACK packet is received. Second, firewalls
or other middleboxes may filter and discard the RST packet from the
server. However, in either case, the detection of TCP connections
will not be disturbed notably. The reason is that even if the RST
packet is discarded or not generated, it is still the same as being
accepted by the client and the shared IPID counter will not have an
additional increment. Instead, when the source port number y is
identified, the challenge ACK packet will be certainly issued to the
client due to the strict standard action enforced by RFC 5961, so
the attacker will observe the change of the IPID counter. Therefore,
the unexpected responses to SYN/ACK packets will not affect the
detection of TCP connections.
(2) Parallel Search for Source Port. The maximum possible port
range is 216 (from 0 to 65535), but the default range of source port
number on Linux is only from 32768 to 61000 and Windows has a
more narrow source port range from 49152 to 655352. To facilitate
the identification of the source port, the attacker can adopt a parallel
approach to search the source port number by sending multiple
probing packets in a certain range during a period. If the source
2The OS types or versions of the client are unrestricted in our exploit.
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port is in the range, the shared IPID counter will have an additional
increment, so the attacker can further narrow the range. Otherwise,
the attacker can detect another port range in parallel. In addition,
the attacker can use a binary-search-like algorithm [9, 10] to further
reduce the detection time cost.
(3) Rate Limit of Challenge ACK. In order to avoid DoS attacks
against the server, the implementations of challenge ACK usually
enforce a rate limit to restrict the number of challenge ACK packets,
e.g., the rate limit enforced on per TCP connection on Linux is
no more than 1 challenge ACK packet per 500ms. Therefore, when
detecting TCP connections using the parallel approach, we need to
consider the rate limit of challenge ACK. Assuming we have located
the source port number in the range of [i, i + n], we need to further
narrow the detection range and the next challenge ACK packet will
be sent in 500ms . In practice, the time cost is acceptable and will
not have a notable impact on the detection time. In our test, we can
detect a victim TCP connection within 40 seconds.
6 INFERRING SEQUENCE AND
ACKNOWLEDGMENT NUMBERS
In this section, we first briefly review the checking mechanism
for TCP sequence and acknowledgment numbers. To detect the
exact sequence number and an acceptable acknowledgment num-
ber for successfully injecting a forged segment into the target TCP
connection, we develop a four-step inference method. First, we
infer acceptable sequence numbers in the server’s receive window.
Second, based on the inferred sequence number, we locate the chal-
lenge ACK window. Third, we detect the lower boundary of the
server’s receive window (i.e., the exact sequence number) based
on the identified acceptable sequence numbers and challenge ACK
window. Finally, we detect the acceptable acknowledgment num-
bers via probing the boundary of the challenge ACK window and
inferring the boundary of the server’s send window. After obtaining
those information, the attacker is able to inject malicious segments
into the target TCP connection.
6.1 Preliminaries: Verifying Sequence Number
An TCP segment receiver first checks the sequence number in
the segment header based on its receive window when a TCP seg-
ment arrives, i.e., the condition of RCV .NXT <= SEG .SEQ <=
RCV .NXT + RCV .WND must be satisfied, where SEG .SEQ is the
sequence number of the received segment, RCV .NXT is the se-
quence number of the next octet that the receiver expects to receive,
and RCV .WND is the receive window size. Besides, the receiver
following RFC 5961 will check the acknowledgment number based
on its acceptable ACK window as described in Section 2.3. After
passing these two checks, the segment will be accepted. In current
TCP implementations, the ACK flag is always set to TRUE except for
the first SYN packet for establishing the connection. As a result, the
guessing of the acknowledgment number cannot be circumvented
by disabling the ACK flag.
Since TCP is a full duplex protocol, when both the sequence and
acknowledgment number acceptable by one side are inferred, the at-
tacker can also identify the sequence and the acknowledgment num-
ber acceptable by the other side. For example, in fact, the RCV .NXT
and SND.NXT on the server are equivalent to SND.NXT and
RCV .NXT on the client [9, 10, 41]. Hence, the attacker only needs
to infer the sequence and acknowledgment numbers of one side. In
our attack, we focus on inferring the sequence and acknowledgment
numbers acceptable by the server.
6.2 Inferring Acceptable Sequence Number
To infer the acceptable sequence numbers on the server side, the
attacker continuously sends ICMP request packets to the server and
observes the IPID values of the reply packets. Then, the attacker
impersonates the victim client to send a spoofed RST packet to the
server. The RST packet is specified with the guessed sequence num-
ber seq. We need to consider two cases: (i) seq not in the server’s
receive window and (ii) seq in the server’s receive window. Accord-
ing to the challenge ACK mechanism described in Section 2.3, in the
first case, the server will discard the spoofed RST packet directly,
so it does not influence the shared IPID counter. In the second case
when the guessed seq is in the server’s receive window, the server
will respond to this RST packet and send a challenge ACK packet to
the victim client to confirm the legitimacy of the packet. The IPID
of this challenge ACK packet is assigned based on the shared IPID
counter, and it will incur an additional increment to the counter.
The attacker can observe the increment and then determine that
the guessed seq is located in the server’s receive window3.
In practice, in order to reduce the time cost of sequence number
inference, the attacker can divide the sequence number space into
multiple blocks whose sizes are equal to the default receive window
size in Linux (87380 octets), probing only once per block. Besides,
the attacker can apply parallel search methods similar to those used
in connections detection to further reduce the time cost.
6.3 Locating the Challenge ACKWindow
According to RFC 5961, when a segment arrives at the server, the
server also checks the segment’s acknowledgment number even
if its sequence number is in the server’s receive window. There
are three cases in the whole acknowledgment number space: (i)
the acknowledgment number in challenge ACK window, (ii) in the
acceptable ACK range, and (iii) invalid acknowledgment numbers.
In the first case, the server will issue a challenge ACK packet to
confirm the legitimacy of the triggering segment. In the second
case, the server will accept the segment directly. Otherwise, if the
segment carries an invalid acknowledgment number, the server
will discard it silently. The last two cases cannot be differentiated
directly because it cannot be observed from an off-path attacker.
However, the attacker can first identify the challenge ACK window
of the server and then infer the acceptable ACK numbers.
When locating the challenge ACK window, the attacker observes
and records the shared IPID counter. Then the attacker imperson-
ates the victim client and sends a spoofed ACK packet with a guessed
acknowledgment number ack to the server, the packet is also speci-
fied with an acceptable sequence number detected previously. If ack
is in the challenge ACKwindow of the server, a challenge ACK packet
will be issued, incurring an additional increment to the shared IPID
counter. Instead, if ack is not in the challenge ACK window, the
3In a special case when seq exactly matches the server’s RCV .NXT , the server will
reset the connection directly. However, the probability of this case occurring is 1/232 ,
which is negligible.
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observed IPID will be continuous from the view of the attacker. In
practice, the challenge ACK window size is always between 1G and
2G [8–10], i.e., one quarter of the entire acknowledgment number
space. Hence, to facilitate the detection, the attacker can divide the
entire space into 4 blocks and probe each block to check which
block the challenge ACK window falls in.
6.4 Detecting the Exact Sequence Number
Nowwe present themethod of detecting the exact sequence number
(i.e., RCV .NXT , the lower boundary of the server’s receive win-
dow) based on the previous inferred results. The attacker can forge
multiple ACK packets with a constant acknowledgment number
ack_challenдe in the challenge ACK window and the specified se-
quence number in each ACK packet set to seq_acceptable − i , where
seq_acceptable is an acceptable sequence number inferred previ-
ously. Then the attacker impersonates the victim client to send
these forged ACK packets to the server. In the beginning, the server
will be triggered to send challenge ACK packets at a rate of one
packet per 500ms due to the rate limit of challenge ACK, so the trig-
gered challenge ACK packets will incur regular increments to the
shared IPID counter. However, once the specified sequence number
seq_acceptable − i reaches RCV .NXT (the lower boundary of the
server’s receive window), the server will switch to send duplicate
ACK packets, which is not enforced by any rate limit. Thus, the
shared IPID counter will have a jitter4, and the attacker can observe
this jitter and then detect the exact sequence number. The detecting
procedure has no side effects, e.g., resetting the connections, on the
connections.
6.5 Detecting Acceptable ACK Number
Once an acknowledgment number ack_challenдe in the challenge
ACK window is identified, the attacker can also detect the boundary
of the challenge ACK window by sending multiple probing ACK
packets and then observing the shared IPID counter, similar to
detecting the lower boundary of the server’s receive window. The
forged probing ACK packets are specified with a constant sequence
number seq_acceptable , and the acknowledgment number of each
ACK packet is set to ack_challenдe − i . In turn, the attacker sends
these forged ACK packets to the server. Challenge ACK packets will
be triggered until ack_challenдe − i reaches the lower boundary of
the challenge ACK window. Once this boundary is detected, then
SND.UNA can be easily inferred, i.e., adding 2G to the detected
boundary. SND.UNA is in the acceptable ACK range. When all
the data sent earlier has been acknowledged, SND.UNA equals
SND.NXT . Instead, if the server has an amount of data to be sent
to the client, SND.NXT can also be inferred by adding the typical
size of the send window to SND.UNA, e.g., 16384 octets in Linux
by default.
7 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We first conduct experiments to show feasibility of identifying
victim clients on the Internet via hash collisions. Next, we conduct
two case studies to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of our
attacks. By launching the TCP connections DoS attacks, an off-path
4 The increments to the shared IPID counter become 20 per 500ms in our experiments,
instead of 1 per 500ms .
attacker can reset a TCP connection in 155 seconds on average. By
conducting the TCP connections manipulation attacks, an off-path
attacker can hijack the session and manipulate web traffic and BGP
routing table within 215 seconds.
Ethical considerations. In order to avoid causing real damages or
negative impacts on the Internet, we choose not to directly attack
real users and their hosts. All the hosts involved in the experiments
are our machines. We evaluate the impacts of our off-path TCP
attacks on the Internet, e.g., measuring Alexa top 100k websites to
identify potential victim servers that are vulnerable to our attack.
However, we do not exploit the vulnerability of these web servers
for real attacks.
7.1 Identifying Victim Clients
We show two scenarios of identifying victim clients via hash col-
lisions after downgrading the server’s IPID assignment. First, we
show how to detect potential victim clients using one IP address.
Second, we illustrate that the attacker can attack arbitrary victim
clients if having enough IP addresses.
Experimental Setup. Two types of hosts are used in this experi-
ment. A server listening on port 80 and waiting for TCP connection
requests is equipped with Ubuntu 18.04 (kernel version 5.5) with a
prefix of 152.136.0.0/16. Attack machines locate in different posi-
tions with independent IP addresses. We use these IP addresses to
detect victim clients to the server. The attackmachines are equipped
with Ubuntu 18.04 (kernel version 4.15) and are able to send packets
to the server with spoofed IP addresses.
Results with One Attacker IP Address.When having only one
IP address, an attacker can detect more than 2 million victim clients
to the server. In this scenario, we deploy one attack machine and as-
sign IP address from a target IP list, which contains several prefixes
owned by different organizations. The attack machine clears the DF
flag of the server’s TCP packets to IP addresses in these prefixes via
forging ICMP “Fragmentation Needed” messages, and then it scans
the target prefixes to identify potential victim clients that share
the same hash-based IPID counter with the attack machine on the
server. The attacker terminates the scanning process after scanning
all IP addresses within the prefix or reaching the time limit (30
minutes in our experiment). The experimental results are shown in
Table 1. By using only one attack machine, the attacker can detect
a considerable number of potential victim clients. For instance, the
numbers of victim clients that collide with the attack machine are
179, 156, and 121 in the prefixes of 3.208.0.0/12, 101.80.0.0/12 and
50.16.0.0/14, respectively. It takes 14.0 seconds on average to detect
a potential victim client. Average outbound traffic of the attack ma-
chine is 125.14 KB/s (i.e., around 584 packets/s). Thus, it is difficult
to detect the malicious probing, e.g., by leveraging network traffic
monitoring systems.
Results with Multiple Attacker IP Addresses. When the at-
tacker has multiple IP addresses, it aims to attack an arbitrary client
to the server using these IP addresses. After selecting the target
client, the attacker clears the DF flag of the server’s TCP packets to
the client by forging an ICMP “Fragmentation Needed” message.
Then, the attacker detects addresses in its address pool to find a
correct one that collides with the target client, i.e., sharing the same
hash-based IPID counter. In this experiment, we select different
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Figure 5: Empirical CDF of time cost and the number of attacker IP addresses needed to detect a hash collision.
Table 1: Detecting victim clients using one IP address.
Prefix
Owner Prefix Location
Victim
clients
Time
(min)
eBay 209.140.128.0/18 US, CA 4 1.32
Yahoo Japan 124.83.128.0/17 JP, TKY 9 2.70
Google 74.125.0.0/16 US, CA 23 5.56
Tencent 162.14.0.0/16 CH, BJ 27 5.54
Facebook 157.240.0.0/16 US, CA 33 5.53
Alibaba 47.56.0.0/15 CH, HK 57 11.3
Amazon 50.16.0.0/14 US, WA 121 22.9
China Telecom 101.80.0.0/12 CH, SH 156 30.0
Amazon 3.208.0.0/12 USA, VA 179 30.0
target clients and repeat the detecting process 200 times. The empir-
ical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the time cost and the
number of required attacker IP addresses are shown in Figure 5. For
an arbitrary target client, the average time cost to detect a correct
IP address in the attacker’s address pool is 15.4 seconds, and the
number of IP addresses needed is 1,837 on average. Furthermore,
after spending 24 seconds to check 3,000 addresses, the attacker
has a probability of 80.0% to identify a correct IP address that can
be used to attack an arbitrary client. The measured probability is
higher than the theoretical one, i.e., 1 − (1 − 1/2048)3000 ≈ 76.9%.
To evaluate the threats of our off-path TCP attack on the Inter-
net, we measure Alexa top 100k websites to identify how many
websites suffer from the vulnerable IPID assignment. We observe
that 22,953 websites are vulnerable to forged ICMP “Fragmentation
Needed” messages from off-path attackers and thus can be tricked
into clearing the DF flag of TCP packets and downgrading the IPID
assignment. These websites are vulnerable to our attack5. We can-
not confirm the effectiveness of the attack against 22,803 websites
that are unreachable from our vantage point in California due to
packet filtering performed by the ISP hosting the vantage point.
Moreover, we suspect that the rest resist to our attack due to two
reasons, i.e., the OS versions of the websites are invulnerable (e.g.,
old Linux kernel versions or Windows), or the forged ICMP error
messages are blocked.
5The attack may be disturbed by noises of non-TCP traffic that happens to share the
same hash-based IPID counter with the attack traffic, however we measure that the
actual disturbance is negligible, see Section 8.1
7.2 Results of TCP DoS Attacks
In this experiment, we show that a TCP connection between a
victim server and a victim client can be reset by an off-path attacker,
resulting in a DoS attack. We conduct the attack under the common
scenario of SSH.
Experimental Setup. This attack involves 3 hosts, namely, an SSH
server equipped with Ubuntu 18.04 (kernel version 4.18 or beyond),
OpenSSH 7.6 and OpenSSL 1.0.2, a victim client who accesses the
server based on SSH connections, and an attack machine equipped
with Ubuntu 18.04 (kernel version 4.15) and a prefix of 152.136.0.0/16
that contains 2000 IP addresses in this prefix. The attack machine
can use these IP addresses to detect hash collisions with the target
client. The attacker attempts to reset the connection via sending
TCP RST packets to the server.
Attack Procedure. In this attack, the 3-tuple [client IP address,
server IP address, server port] is known. First, the attacker identifies
an IP address in its prefix which collides with the client IP address.
Second, based on the identified attacker IP address, the attacker
infers the correct client port number and the exact sequence number
(RCV .NXT on the server side) of the victim SSH connection. Finally,
a spoofed RST packet specified with the inferred value is sent to
the server, and the server will be tricked into resetting the SSH
connection from the victim client. In this attack, the acceptable
acknowledgment numbers are not needed.
Table 2: Experimental results of SSH connection reset.
Server
address
Linux
version
Time
cost (s)
Bandwidth
cost (KB/s)
Success
rate
62.234.203.× 4.19 148.7 25.02 9/10
152.136.49.× 4.20 150.2 25.03 10/10
152.136.59.× 5.3 160.1 24.95 9/10
62.234.182.× 5.5 156.3 25.20 44/50
Experimental Results. On average, the time cost of identifying a
correct attacker IP address is 15.4 seconds, and the correct one will
be identified after checking 1,837 IP addresses on average. Table 2
illustrates our experimental results. We test the attack against 4
servers that are equipped with Linux kernel version 4.19, 4.20, 5.3,
and 5.5, respectively. The diversity of servers ensures the feasibility
and effectiveness of the attack. The average time cost of resetting an
SSH connection is 155 seconds, and the success rate is over 88%. TCP
connections DoS attack is particularly applicable to compromising
applications secured by encrypted traffic, e.g., HTTPS and SSH.
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7.3 Results of TCP Manipulation Attacks
In this case, we perform two attacks to demonstrate that the newly
discovered IPID side channel can be exploit to manipulate a TCP
connection maliciously, thus causing serious damage to the upper
applications including HTTP and BGP.
(1) Manipulating Web Traffic. We demonstrate that under the
typical web application scenario, an off-path attacker can detect a
victim client connecting to the target web server and then hijack
the connection between the server and the client.
Experimental Setup. This attack involves 3 hosts. A web server
is equipped with Linux kernel version 5.5 and a popular real-time
communication web application called Rocket.Chat [45]. An attack
machine is equipped with Ubuntu 18.04 (kernel version 4.15), and
it is able to send packets to the server with a spoofed IP address.
A client can access the web server based on HTTP. Note the OS
type or version of the client is unrestricted in our attack. The at-
tacker attempts to identify the potential victim client and hijack
the TCP connection between the server and the client. For instance,
the attacker may impersonate the victim client to inject malicious
segments into the server and then inject fake messages into the
chatting group. Here, the server IP address and server port are
publicly known.
Attack Procedure. The attacker first downgrades the server’s IPID
assignment and detects potential victim clients who share the same
hash-based IPID counter with the attacker. Next, the attack can be
constructed in the following four steps: (1) detecting whether the
client has a TCP connection to the server, i.e., identifying correct
source port number to obtain the TCP 4-tuple information, (2) in-
ferring the exact sequence number, i.e., RCV .NXT on the server,
which can slide the server’s receive window, leading to that the
segment can be delivered to HTTP immediately, (3) inferring the
acceptable acknowledgment numbers, and (4) injecting forged seg-
ments specified with the inferred values into the server and pushing
fake messages into the chatting group.
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Figure 6: Time/Bandwidth overheads of web manipulation.
Experimental Results. It takes 14.0 seconds to detect a potential
victim client and 35.4 seconds to identify the correct source port
number of the TCP connection. Figure 6 shows that the time cost
in inferring the acceptable sequence numbers, locating the chal-
lenge ACK window, detecting the exact sequence number and an
acceptable acknowledgment number are 123.8 seconds, 0.7 seconds,
18.7 seconds and 14.0 seconds, respectively. On average, the overall
time cost of this attack is 206.6 seconds, including the time cost
of detecting the victim client that can be performed in advance.
64.3% of the overall time is spent on inferring the acceptable se-
quence numbers. The reason is that the server’s receive window is
relatively narrow and the attacker must sample a large number of
sequence numbers. The average bandwidth overhead of this attack
is 23.55 KB/s. Finally, when the server accepts the forged segment,
the fake messages in the segment will be stored on the server and
advertised to group members, as shown in Figure 7. Overall, the
success rate of this attack is over 90%.
Figure 7: Snapshot of messages viewed by group members.
(2) Manipulating BGP Routing Table. In this case, we demon-
strate that an off-path attacker can manipulate BGP routing tables
by performing our attacks on long-lived TCP connections. We show
that the off-path attacker can pretend to be a legitimate BGP router
and inject malicious BGP messages into other BGP peers, thus
poisoning their BGP routing tables.
Experimental Setup. This attack involves 3 hosts. A BGP server
is equipped with Linux kernel version 5.5, listening on its port
179. A BGP client is equipped with Ubuntu 18.04. Both the server
and the client run the BGP suite of Quagga [27] with version 1.2.0.
After the client initiates a BGP connection, the two peers advertise
BGP messages to each other and update their BGP route tables. An
attack machine is equipped with Ubuntu 18.04, and it is able to send
packets with a spoofed IP address. The attacker aims to identify the
potential victim client and hijack the BGP connection. We show
that the attacker can impersonate the client and manipulate the
server’s BGP route table. We assume that the server IP address and
server port are publicly known.
Attack Procedure. Similar to the HTTP hijacking attack, after
downgrading the server’s IPID assignment and identifying a victim
client, the attacker first learn the presence of a BGP connection
between the server and the identified client. Then, it infers the exact
sequence number and an acceptable acknowledgment number to
the server. Finally, the attacker sends forged BGP messages to the
server based on the inferred values to poison the routing table.
Experimental Results. Figure 8 presents a snapshot of the poi-
soned BGP routing table. The Network Layer Reachability Informa-
tion (NLRI) of network “99.99.99.0/24” and “88.88.88.0/24” is fake,
which are not advertised by router 172.21.0.70 but injected by the
attacker. On average, the attacker can finish BGP routing table poi-
soning in 214.3 seconds (including the time cost of identifying the
victim client), with a success rate over 90%.
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Figure 8: Snapshot of the poisoned BGP routing table.
8 DISCUSSION AND COUNTERMEASURE
8.1 Attack Robustness
(1) IPID noises. Unlike the global IPID counter that is noisy due
to the sharing between all outgoing traffic, the downgraded hash-
based IPID counter shared between the attacker and the victim
client on the TCP server side is reliable, and hence our attack does
not suffer the traditional noise issue [16, 17, 37, 38].
Since the outgoing TCP traffic directed to irrelevant clients uses
per-socket-based IPID counters instead of the hash-based IPID
counters, irrelevant TCP traffic will not disturb our attack. We
measure and evaluate the disturbances from the noises of non-TCP
traffic in the real world and find that the impact is also limited. We
find that the hash-based IPID counters of more than 91% vulnerable
websites in the Alexa top 100k websites list are not disturbed at
all (within 5 minutes in our experiment), which means the IPIDs
are always contiguous and there is no outgoing traffic sharing the
same hash-based IPID counter with the attacker at the server in
this time window. Note that, less than 9% vulnerable websites are
disturbed by non-TCP traffic, e.g., the ICMP traffic generated by
these websites, that happens to share the same hash-based IPID
counter with the attack traffic during the period. Considering that
our attack can be finished within 215 seconds, the real disturbance
is negligible. Moreover, other types of noises that specific to certain
application/network scenarios, e.g., packet loss, can be effectively
mitigated by re-running the attack multiple times. For example, in
our experiments, when we detect a potential victim, we usually
conduct the detection process again to enhance the confidence,
which incurs around 6 seconds additional delay but can almost
eliminate the false positives. We confirm the results by generating
random packet loss in our experiments.
(2) Multiple Connections from the Victim Client. The poten-
tial victim clients who collide with the attacker can be identified in
advance (i.e., being independent of TCP connections), so the side
channel will always exist until the server restart.
When there is more than one TCP connection between the server
and the victim client, since these connections are mapped into the
same hash-based IPID counter, theywill interferewith the attacker’s
observation, thus affecting the success rate of the attack against
the target connection. However, in practice, this circumstance is
rare, since the client usually does not initiate multiple TCP connec-
tions to the same server in parallel, particularly, HTTP/1.1 [19] and
HTTP/2 [6] work based on one TCP connection even if there are
multiple HTTP requests to the server.
(3) More Victim Clients under the NAT Scenario.Network Ad-
dress Translation (NAT) is a widely used technique to overcome
the shortage of IPv4 addresses [48]. Under this scenario, multiple
hosts share a public IP address. As a result, if the attacker identifies
a potential victim client who accesses the Internet via NAT tech-
nique, it indicates that all hosts behind the same NAT gateway are
potential victims. Hence, in practice, the actual number of victim
clients is far greater than the number of being identified, and the
NAT technique incurs a more wide attack surface.
Note if more than one host behind the NAT gateway connects
to the target server at the same time, the TCP connections initiated
from these hosts will share the same IPID counter on the server
and would interfere with the attacker’s observation. In practise, the
impact is limited, since it requires these hosts to access the same
target server at the same time and all the established connections
have continuous data transmission from the server to the hosts.
(4) Shifting Sequence and Acknowledgment Numbers. An-
other circumstance that may affect the success rate of the attack
is the shifting of the sequence and acknowledgment numbers, i.e.,
if the victim TCP connection has ongoing traffic, the acceptable
sequence and acknowledgment numbers may shift as the attack is
in progress. This problem can be solved by the repeated inference
of the acceptable sequence and acknowledgment numbers. We con-
firm that if the receive window does not slide very quickly, e.g.,
under the scenarios of SSH and BGP, the success rate of the attack
will not be affected obviously. Even if the receive window slides
quickly enough to break the attacker’s inference, the attacker can
choose to exploit the other side of the TCP connection where the
receive window slides more slowly.
8.2 Countermeasures
We have reported the newly discovered IPID side channel to the
Linux community. Meanwhile, we also propose to throttle the ex-
ploit via eliminating the root cause, i.e., repairing the IPID assign-
ment to TCP packets.
(1) Assigning IPID Based on the Protocol Field. The root cause
of the attack is that Linux can be tricked into choosing an incorrect
IPID assignment policy for TCP packets. When Linux assigns IPID
to TCP packets, it decides which policy to be chosen based on
the DF flag in IP header, rather than the Protocol field. Therefore,
attackers can clear the DF bit of the TCP packets by forging ICMP
“Fragmentation Needed” messages, which causes hash collisions
and build a side channel. To address this issue, we propose to assign
IPID by evaluating if a packet is originated from TCP based on the
field of Protocol in IP header, instead of the DF flag. If the packet’s
Protocol field is specified as TCP, we assign IPID for the packet
based on the per-socket assignment policy. As a result, all TCP
packets will no longer share IPID counters with the attacker and
the side channel can be eliminated. We implement the mechanism
in Linux 4.18 and confirm its effectiveness through real evaluation.
(2) Enhancing IPIDAssignment for RSTPackets.Another coun-
termeasure is to change the IPID assignment of RST packets, which
allows an attacker to infer the connection information. Since Linux
kernel version 4.18, Linux directly sets the IPID of RST packets to
0, which is also vulnerable and can be abused. When an attacker
learn the presence of a TCP connection between the server and
the identified victim client, the attacker can forge SYN/ACK packets.
If there is no connection initiated from the specified source port,
the server responds with a RST packet, otherwise, with a challenge
ACK packet. The IPID of the RST packet is 0, and hence it will not
cause an increment to the shared IPID counter. It will be different
from the behavior of the challenge ACK packet, which enables an
indicator for the attacker to judge the existence of the connection.
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Thus, we propose to modify the IPID assignment for RST pack-
ets. Note we cannot assign IPID for RST packets based on a socket
preserved counter, since the RST packets may be generated and
issued independently of a TCP connection. Also, we cannot assign
IPID for RST packets based on hash IPID counters, since this assign-
ment is vulnerable to TCP/IP connections detecting attacks [3]. An
empirical method is to assign IPID for RST packets based on the
destination of the packet, i.e., selecting the IPID counter assigned
to the destination. If there is a TCP connection to the destination
(the victim client in our scenario) and the counter preserved in the
socket will be selected, it can avoid the differences on the counter.
9 RELATEDWORK
IPID Side Channels. IPID ensures the uniqueness of a packet
for packet fragmentation and reassembly [40, 50]. However, IPID
has been widely abused to conduct off-path attacks due to the
vulnerable assignment methods. Ensafi et al. performed idle port
scan and network protocol analysis by leveraging the side channel
of global IPID counters [17]. They also suggested that the global
IPID counters can be used to detect intentional packet drops [16].
By leveraging the side channel of global IPID counters, Pearce et
al. measured the reachability between any two Internet locations
without controlling a measurement vantage point [37, 38]. Jeffrey
et al. showed that per-destination IPID counters are also vulnerable,
which can be exploited to infer the number of packets between two
machines with UDP and ICMP and even learn the presence of a
TCP connection by launching off-path attacks [29]. Alexander et al.
detected TCP connections via IPID hash collisions. They leveraged
the IPID of the triggered RST packets to determine the presence of
a victim TCP connection [3]. Their method can only detect TCP
connections, but not hijacking a TCP connection. Moreover, the
vulnerabilities they used have been fixed since Linux kernel version
4.18. In this paper, we identified a new vulnerability of abusing
IPID, which can be exploited by off-path attackers to perform a
TCP hijacking attack.
TCPHijacking Attacks. Cao et al. found that an off-path attacker
can infer whether two arbitrary hosts on the Internet are com-
municating using a TCP connection by utilizing a side channel
in the challenge ACK mechanism, identify the sequence and ac-
knowledgment numbers of the connection, and then hijack the
connections [9, 10]. The side channel vulnerability has been elim-
inated by setting a random challenge ACK count limit. A timing
side channel has been uncovered in the half-duplex IEEE 802.11 or
Wi-Fi technology, which can be exploited by an off-path attacker
to inject data into a TCP connection and force the browser to cache
malicious objects [12]. By exploiting the global IPID counter which
was adopted by the previous Linux and Windows systems, Gilad et
al. inferred if two hosts have established a TCP connection identi-
fied by a specific four-tuple and then launch off-path TCP injection
attacks to poison the HTTP and Tor traffic [20, 21, 23, 24].
Besides, unprivileged applications or sandboxed scripts con-
trolled by attackers running on victim hosts (called puppets) can
also be leveraged to perform off-path TCP attacks [22, 42, 43]. Qian
et al. uncovered that the middlebox of firewall can be abused to
perform the TCP sequence number inference attack [42], and con-
ducted a collaborative TCP sequence number inference attack by
exploiting the packet counter side channels [43]. Gilad et al. iden-
tified that attackers can conduct web cache poisoning attacks by
leveraging a restricted script in the user’s browser sandbox [22].
Compared with these attacks, our off-path TCP attack is a pure
off-path one and does not need any assistance of puppets. Moreover,
our attack leverages a new side channel vulnerability appearing
in the interactions among IP, ICMP, and TCP, which cannot be
unearthed by the principled methods [11].
TCP DoS Attacks. TCP SYN flooding is a major threat that is dif-
ficult to be identified due to the similarity to the legitimate es-
tablishment of TCP connections [1, 5, 15, 51]. Similarly, TCP FIN
flooding, TCP RST flooding, TCP ACK flooding, TCP URG flooding,
and TCP Null flooding are other typical TCP DoS attacks [2, 28],
which aim to cause resource exhaustion of the TCP connection.
Besides these brute-force attacks, more sophisticated and stealth
DoS attacks against TCP protocol have been developed and become
difficult to detect or mitigate, such as low-rate TCP-targeted DoS
attacks [26, 30, 31, 46] or congesting intermediate links [36, 47].
10 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we uncover a new off-path TCP hijacking attack
that leverages a subtle side channel in the new mixed IPID assign-
ment method of Linux kernel version 4.18 and beyond. We find
that a pure off-path attacker can downgrade the IPID assignment
for TCP packets from the more secure per-socket-based policy to
hash-based policy, thus building a shared IPID counter that can
be observed to learn the presence of victim TCP connections and
then infer the sequence numbers and acknowledgment numbers of
the connection. We evaluate the impacts of the new off-path TCP
exploit on the Internet and implement the exploit under different
scenarios. Our experiments show that off-path attackers can per-
form various attacks by exploiting the newly discovered IPID side
channel, e.g., resetting SSH connections, manipulating web traffic
and poisoning BGP routing tables. We also propose to eliminate the
root cause of the exploit via repairing the IPID assignment to TCP
packets in Linux. We implement our countermeasure and confirm
its effectiveness in practice.
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